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Abstract Research on Eastern Europe stresses the weakness of its civil society and the
lack of political and social involvement, neglecting the question: What do people them-
selves think it means to be a good citizen? This study looks at citizens’ deﬁnitions of good
citizenship in Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, using 2002 European
Social Survey data. We investigate mean levels of civic mindedness in these countries and
perform regression analyses to investigate whether factors traditionally associated with
civic and political participation are also correlated with citizenship norms across Eastern
Europe. We show that mean levels of civic mindedness differ signiﬁcantly across the four
Eastern European countries. We ﬁnd some support for theories on civic and political
participation when explaining norms of citizenship, but also demonstrate that individual-
level characteristics are differently related to citizenship norms across the countries of our
study. Hence, our ﬁndings show that Eastern Europe is not a monolithic and homogeneous
bloc, underscoring the importance of taking the speciﬁcities of countries into account.
Keywords Citizenship norms  Eastern Europe  Public opinion
What does it mean to be a citizen in Eastern Europe today? Most of the current research on
citizenship in Eastern Europe is pervaded by concerns about low levels of organizational
membership and political and electoral participation (Howard 2002): whatever eagerness
there was to vote after democratization has apparently dissipated. However, what has
largely been neglected in discussions on the lack of citizenship in Eastern Europe, is the
citizens’ own conceptualization of good citizenship. That is, what do citizens understand
by the term ‘‘good citizenship’’? These considerations about ‘‘good citizenship’’ might help
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DOI 10.1007/s11205-009-9488-8us to understand why citizens behave in certain ways (van Deth 2007). Besides, the way
citizens themselves deﬁne the concept of citizenship is a subject of crucial importance for
policy makers, politicians and philosophers ‘‘who need to know what the present situation
is before they can decide what should be done about it’’ (Conover et al. 1991: 801).
Even though political theorists have examined the qualities of good citizenship in depth,
empirical political and social scientists have produced only a handful of studies—focusing
on West European countries and the US—analyzing the public’s understanding of this
concept (Almond and Verba 1963; Conover et al. 2004; Dalton 2008a; Denters et al. 2007;
Theiss-Morse 1993). In this paper, we look at which deﬁnitions of good citizenship are
held by the citizens in four Eastern European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Slovenia. In doing this, we hope to contribute to the scarce empirical studies
on citizens’ own perspectives, which have focused on Western countries. The Eastern
European experience with communism makes their deﬁnitions of citizenship particularly
interesting. In communism, citizens were not faced with choices (Colton 2000;V o ¨lker and
Flap 2001); they were part of an act of mass mobilization demanded by a totalitarian
regime that controlled most spheres of life and repressed all forms of autonomous non-state
activity.
Our comparison of four Eastern European countries involves a comparative research
strategy that contrasts a small number of cases in order to grasp the peculiarities of each
case (Tilly 1984). While all four countries underwent a lengthy period of socialization to
Soviet-style norms and behavior, and were characterized by similar state and party
structures and economic and social mechanisms (McGregor 1996), there are broad con-
trasts between the countries. Indeed, even though each country was governed by a com-
munist party for more than 40 years, the degree of penetration of communism in each
country differs signiﬁcantly. We will consider how these contextual differences within
Eastern Europe may explain cross-national differences in citizenship norms.
Next to comparing the civic mindedness across four Eastern European countries, we
investigate whether factors typically associated with civic participation—in mostly Wes-
tern research—also inﬂuence civic mindedness. In other words, given the scarce empirical
work on citizenship norms in general and in Eastern Europe in particular, we will test
whether models of civic participation replicate to civic mindedness in recently established
democracies. Besides, we explore whether these correlates operate in the same way in the
four Eastern European countries involved in our study.
This article is structured as follows. We begin with a discussion on the effect of the
historical and political context on citizenship norms. In the following section, we brieﬂy
review theories on civic and political participation which relevance for explaining citi-
zenship norms will be tested in the empirical section. The next part introduces data and
measurements. The analyses are presented in the third section. We conclude with a brief
summary of the results and some suggestions for further research.
1 Citizenship Norms Across Eastern European Countries
Time and again, research on civic participation comparing Eastern and Western European
countries has found lower levels of citizenship in Central European countries. For example,
Fidrmuc and Ge ¨rxhani (2005), Curtis et al. (2001) and Howard (2002) show that Eastern
European countries lag behind Western European countries with respect to civic partici-
pation. Similarly, Adam et al. (2004) and Paldam and Svedsen (2000) ﬁnd a gap in the
stock of social capital between Western countries and formerly communist countries and
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123ascribe it to the legacy of communism. Looking at citizenship norms, Denters et al. (2007:
97), ﬁnd prevalent differences between the east and the west. In traditional Western
European countries, citizens give the highest priority to critical and deliberative principles
of citizenship, followed by law-abidingness and solidarity. In Eastern nations, law-abi-
dingness ranks ﬁrst and critical and deliberative values second.
Lower levels of participation and citizenship among citizens in Eastern Europe are often
blamed on the communist experience (Adam et al. 2004; Curtis et al. 2001; Howard 2002;
Hutcheson and Korosteleva 2006; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Paldam and Svedsen
2000). According to Curtis et al. (2001: 787) ‘‘citizens of established and stable democ-
racies, because they generally have had more experience with the principles and practices
of free association, will tend to be more active in forming and joining voluntary organi-
zations of different types’’. In a similar line of reasoning, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) state
that the adjustments to life under communism have clear implications for values. We argue
that this obviously applies to norms regarding democratic citizenship, the expression of
which was frustrated during communism. Indeed, communism meant that the only choice
of political identiﬁcation was identiﬁcation with the party—the Communist Party (Rose
and Makkai 1995). The electorate could not choose between competing political parties
and was more an object of politics then an active political subject (Wolchik 1992). In
addition, communist regimes sought to repress all forms of autonomous non-state activity,
and supplanted and subverted such activity by forcing their citizens to join and participate
in mandatory, state-controlled organizations (Howard 2002). Hence, the new regimes that
arose after the collapse of communism challenged people to re-learn political and civic
attitudes and behavior (Mishler and Rose 2002).
Despite the clear demarcation that has been found between Western and Eastern
European countries with respect to citizenship, signiﬁcant differences between Eastern
European countries also occur. For example, Curtis et al. (2001) show that whereas par-
ticipation in associations is generally lower within Eastern European nations, East Ger-
many ranks signiﬁcantly higher than the average count for all nations. Likewise, Rose et al.
(1998) have argued that there is fairly wide variation among the countries of the post-
communist region with respect to civil society. With respect to citizenship norms, Denters
et al. (2007) also reveal signiﬁcant outliers in their regional Eastern/Western pattern. For
example, according to their ﬁndings, Slovenia joins the group of Western European
democracies, rather than the group of Eastern nations. We argue that an obvious potential
explanation for these differences across countries within Eastern Europe may be the
contrasting ways in which communism was experienced within the Eastern European
countries. There were differences in the way communism was introduced and citizens were
repressed, and also in the way the communist regime fell and the process of democrati-
zation was experienced, which may result in different norms for civic-oriented behavior.
Indeed, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) argue that the impact of communism on values and
norms is weaker where the resistance and opposition to communism were greater. Based
on this, we would expect to ﬁnd more civic mindedness in countries with a weaker
penetration of communism; therefore, we expect to ﬁnd fewer civic norms in a country like
the Czech Republic, which was characterized by a ‘‘hard line’’ and very rigid communism
after 1968 (Wallace 1997). Janos (1996) describes Czechoslovakia after 1968 as an e ´tatist,
militarized, solidary state, whereas he labeled Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia as
reformist (market socialist), civic states. The political formula that existed in Czechoslo-
vakia identiﬁed the fundamental purpose of the state as promoting proletarian interna-
tionalism and operational codes, reﬂected in both public policy and the cultural norms
fostered by the party leadership. Mishler and Rose (2002: 10) indicate that months before
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123the fall of the Berlin wall, Freedom House classiﬁed Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia as
‘‘partly free,’’ whereas Czechoslovakia was placed almost at the extreme undemocratic
endpoint.
As Ishiyama (1995: 158) notes, the Czech communist party had ‘‘a long tradition as a
‘home-grown’ communist movement, although this image was seriously tarnished by the
events of 1968.’’ In contrast, the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and the Hungarian
Socialist Workers’ Party were perceived as an ‘‘alien’’ political force, imposed from the
outside by the Soviet Union (Ishiyama 1995). Ishiyama (1995: 158–159) goes on to state
that ‘‘the lack of domestic legitimacy resulted in a greater willingness on the part of the
Polish and Hungarian parties to engage in economic and political reform to ‘legitimize’
party rule, as compared to the Czechoslovak communist party.’’ In the Polish and Hun-
garian communist parties, there also emerged a historical tradition of tolerance for some
measure of intra-party political pluralism and moderate reform, which implied a greater
willingness to accept the movement toward democratic reform (Ishiyama 1995).
In contrast, the Czech communist party tended to produce ideological conformity. At
the end of the 1980s—when communism crumbled in Eastern Europe—the Czech elite, in
contrast to their Polish and Hungarian counterparts, initially appeared conﬁdent and were
willing to employ force in order to maintain communist rules (Vo ¨lgyes 1992). The Czech
leadership—which had little experience with reform or societal negotiation, given the
stagnation of the Czech communist party after 1968 (Grzymala-Busse 2002)—put little
effort into reaching any sort of accommodation with the opposition prior to the end of
communist rule, as occurred in Hungary and Poland (Wolchik 1992).
In Poland, the communist military regime of the 1980s undertook signiﬁcant economic
reforms and emerged as an engine of market liberalization (Markowski 1997). In other
words, there was greater willingness among the forces of the old regime in Poland to make
concessions and promote change. A survey of local leaders conducted in Poland in the fall/
winter of 1989/1990 revealed an unexpectedly high degree of acceptance of democratic
change (Wiatr 2003). Moreover, Poland was blessed with an individual (Lech Walesa) and
an organization (Solidarnos ´c ´ [Solidarity]) that became the focus of change. It has indeed
been argued that the importance of the Solidarity movement, which enjoyed support from
the majority of Polish citizens, cannot be overestimated (Bakuniak and Nowak 1987;
Raciborski and Wiatr 2005). Solidarity embodied a collective actor that undertook action
on the scale of the entire society. Besides, the Polish communist state failed in its attempt
to prevent the public presence and even the functioning of the churches (Tomka 1998). The
Polish church played a signiﬁcant role in safeguarding the national consciousness and was
closely connected with anti-communist resistance (Schanda 2003). It became a focal point
for dissent in the 1980s and was the bastion of independence from communist control
(Korbonski 1992; Need and Evans 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2001).
In Hungary, the attack on communism as a system ﬁrst came from among the ranks of
communist reformers themselves. They had already promoted a ‘‘goulash socialism’’
during the communist period: a set of measures intended to raise living standards while
maintaining state control (Rose and Makkai 1995).
Slovenia (due mainly to a favorable initial economic position and pre-existing social
policies) was able to absorb economic shocks and managed to experience a ‘‘soft transi-
tion’’ (Wright et al. 2004). The composition of Slovenia’s economic structure is also
closest to that of West European states, and there has been less continuity of the post-
communist state and administrative legacies in the country. Moreover, Slovenia has had
the lowest level of welfare problems (Dyson 2007).
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Political theorists have discussed about good citizenship for centuries and even today,
citizenship is a highly contested concept. Civic virtues such as moral obligation to pursue
the common good, social engagement, and political activism have been interpreted as
prerequisites of good citizenship (Denters et al. 2007). However, whether or not all citizens
are willing to take on such responsibilities is a matter of debate and empirical research on
how citizens themselves deﬁne their responsabilities and ‘good citizenship’ is limited. By
contrast, civic and political participation have been extensively studied, in Western Europe
and—to a lesser extent—in Eastern Europe. In these studies, a wide range of theories have
been applied to describe individual-level participation in politics and civil society. Less is
known, however, about the applicability of these theories with respect to civic mindedness
in Eastern Europe. In this paragraph, we brieﬂy review relevant theories of political and
civic participation, which relevance to explain citizenship norms will be tested in our
empirical section.
To begin, a vast body of research supports religion as an explanation of political and
civic behavior (Driskell et al. 2008; Hooghe 2003a; Park and Smith 2000; Putnam 2000;
Verba et al. 1995). There has been consistent evidence of a positive relationship between
both religious faith and church attendance and political and civic participation (Beyerlein
and Chaves 2003; Billiet 1998; Hooghe 2003a; Wuthnow et al. 1990). Concerns about
fundamentalist religion aside, most scholars have noted that most religious congregations
and groups are contributing important resources that help sustain the vitality of civil
society (Welch et al. 2004). Several reasons have been given for the positive relationship
between religiosity and civic involvement (Crystal and DeBell 2002). First, religion tends
to bring people into social networks and creates strong associational ties. It is related to
Durkheim’s (1912) argument that rituals of religion generate group cohesion and soli-
darity, intensifying the links between citizens and their society. Second, active involvement
in a religious faith enhances general organizational knowledge and skills (Deleon and Naff
2004). In particular scholars of political sociology emphasize that religion provides an
important source of social capital and democratic skills that facilitate democratic partici-
pation (Verba et al. 1995). Finally, faith may promote civic orientation indirectly because
churches or synagogues are venues where issues of public concern are discussed or directly
challenged through preaching and endorsing norms of cooperation and civic involvement.
Compared to the studies mentioned above which have been conducted in Western
societies, research on Eastern Europe revealed less convincing relations between religion
and citizens’ participation. Letki (2004) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of church-service
attendance on political participation, and Badescu and Neller (2007) show that Eastern
European countries display weaker relationships between church attendance and
involvement in associations. Communist efforts to stamp out religion and to exclude
religious organizations from public life may explain why such weaker correlations appear
in Eastern than in Western Europe.
Myriad studies—both in Western and former communist countries—have pointed to
differences between men and women in political participation, suggesting a so-called
‘gender gap’. They report that women are less involved than men in political and social
life, mostly due to their lack of socio-economic resources (Schlozman et al. 1995; Letki
2004). One such a resource is women’s occupational status. Beckwith (1986) revealed that
differences in occupational status account for gender differences in levels of political
involvement. It is indeed a tacit assumption in most research that occupational status
affects political participation (Verba et al. 1995). Another resource which is a commonly
Citizenship Norms in Eastern Europe 483
123used factor to explain variations in political and social participation is education. It is
consistently found that education increases participation (Hooghe 2003a; Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone 1980). Education offers people the necessary resources and skills to participate
in political and social life. Besides, it may, as Denny and Doyle (2008: 294) note: ‘‘instil a
sense of civic duty by fostering democratic values and beliefs and encouraging partici-
pation in socially orientated activities.’’ It is also shown that marriage increases time spent
in formal community organizations and neighborhood, and fosters political activity (Put-
nam 2000; Verba et al. 1997).
In the recent literature on participation, several authors have painted a portrait of
declining participation levels and an unengaged younger generation. For example, Putnam
(2000) has observed an erosion of civic community in the USA due to generational
replacement. This lament about a lack of commitment to community within the younger
generation has however been challenged by some analysts. They emphasize the devel-
opment of a new style of citizenship. Dalton (2006b) shows that old forms of political
participation are in a downward spiral and that younger people are less likely to vote and to
participate in campaign activities. At the same time, Dalton (2006b) illustrates that citizen-
initiated and policy-oriented forms of political activity gradually acquire importance,
particularly among the younger generation. So, even though age increases traditional types
of civic and political participation such as voting, young citizens are more active in less
mainstream types of activism (Dalton 2006b). With respect to citizens’ social participation
in Eastern Europe, some scholars (Howard 2002) have stated that a generational shift might
cause an increase of participation. Sztompka (1996: 126) argues that: ‘‘as long as the
majority of the population consists of the people whose young, formative years, and
therefore crucial socializing experiences fall under the rule of the communist regime, one
can expect the continuing vitality of the bloc culture.’’ However, he adds that this will
change over time, as ‘‘new demographic cohorts replace the older generations at the central
positions in a society.’’ Nevertheless, empirical research has so far shown a positive and
highly statistically signiﬁcant impact of age on political involvement (Letki 2004).
Finally, the literature on social capital (Putnam 2000) links trust to civic community,
participation and membership. The higher the institutional trust citizens have, the stronger
their social and political involvement. A public that is dissatisﬁed with political institutions
is less likely to vote and may be hesitant to serve on a jury or perform other public service
activities (Dalton 2006b).
In addition to trust in institutions, social trust has been linked to citizen involvement.
DiFrancesco and Gitelman (1984: 610) note that ‘‘trust is essential to cooperative public
activity.’’ Putnam (1995: 73) formulated a similar line of reasoning when stating that
‘‘social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated.’’ According to Putnam (1995),
trust and involvement are two facets of social capital. In their recent cross-national
comparison of the USA, Eastern and Western Europe, Howard and Gilbert (2008) ﬁnd
that active citizens are more likely to be trusting than inactive people. In her study on
political involvement in ten East European countries, Letki (2004) notes that the impact
of social trust is positive but weak. Gibson’s (2001) analysis reveals that interpersonal
trust has little to do with attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes. He
suggests that while citizens of post-communist countries use networks and interpersonal
trust in everyday life, these resources are politically largely irrelevant. Dekker et al.
(1997) found that social trust is not related to membership or volunteering in certain types
of groups such as political parties in most of the fourteen West European countries
investigated by the authors.
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As noted above, in this paper we investigate citizens’ own deﬁnitions of citizenship in
Eastern Europe. Even though politicians expect citizens to be ‘‘responsible,’’ the exact
meaning of responsibility and good citizenship is open to multiple interpretations (Dalton
2006a), and citizens themselves might hold different deﬁnitions.
We employ data from the European Social Survey (ESS) large-scale comparative
research project. The ESS is a cross-national collaboration of surveys, each of which is
ﬁelded by a scientiﬁc organization within the member nation, offering data representative
for the countries’ adult population (older than 15).
1 The ﬁrst round of the ESS in 2002
looked into the meaning of citizenship for citizens themselves, which makes it valuable for
our study. We include in our analysis the four Eastern European countries with available
data on citizenship norms: Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, resulting in
6,674 respondents. Before turning to the analyses, we will discuss the dependent and
independent variables in the next two sections.
3.1 Dependent Variables
To investigate what citizens actually think about citizenship, the respondents were asked
how they think a ‘‘good citizen’’ should behave: ‘‘To be a good citizen, how important is it
for a person to….’’ The following items were listed (scored from 0 if considered extremely
unimportant to 10 if considered extremely important):
• vote in elections
• be active in voluntary associations
• be active in politics
• support others who are worse off in society
• form an independent opinion
• obey laws and regulations
The ESS question thus considers different aspects of citizenship (Dalton 2006a). First, it
deﬁnes citizenship in terms of attitudes toward the role of the individual in the political and
social system, a role that is central to the literature on democracy. Then, the survey taps
into the citizen’s autonomy by asking about the importance of forming an independent
opinion, and ﬁnally, it looks at the acceptance of state authority (i.e., obeying laws and
regulations) as referring to social order. Solidarity as a category of citizenship is included
through the question about a citizen’s concern for others.
There is a pluralism of civic norms and citizens may have different images of a ‘‘good
citizen’’. In line with Dalton’s (2006a) research with regard to the American public, we
operationalized two components: citizen duty and engaged citizenship. The ﬁrst involves a
norm of social order (i.e., the importance of obeying laws and regulations) and the
responsibility to vote. It stresses obligations and refers to a more traditional concept of
citizenship. The second includes measures of solidarity and voluntary engagement.
According to Dalton (2006a), this expressive, participatory emphasis of engaged citizen-
ship overlaps with the patterns of post-material or self-expressive values that Inglehart
(1990) has related to post-industrial societies. Inglehart (1990) has pointed out that the
1 Detailed information about the survey and the sampling procedures is available on the survey’s website:
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org
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patory, type of social and political order and citizenship.
The results of operationalizing the two components using a principle component
analysis (PCA) are summarized in Table 1.
The ﬁrst dimension refers to the engaged type of citizenship norms. It primarily
involves forms of participation. Participation in voluntary associations is most strongly
related to this component (.86), closely followed by being active in politics (.81). The
component also incorporates a measure of solidarity and a norm of autonomy (that one
should form opinions independently of others). The second dimension, citizen duty,
involves the responsibility to vote and to obey laws and regulations.
2
3.2 Explanatory Variables
To begin, we consider two measurements of religion. Religious denomination is divided
into a dummy which takes the value of 1 when the respondent considers him/herself to be
religious and 0 otherwise. Religious attendance is a continuous variable ranging from 1 to
7 and coded such that higher scores represent more religious involvement.
Education represents a variable of three categories: respondents whose highest attained
education level is primary, those whose highest level is secondary, and those who have had
an education beyond secondary. Gender is a dummy variable with the value 0 for male and
1 for female respondents. Age, measured by the year of birth of respondents, is a con-
tinuous variable and of particular importance in a study of Eastern Europe, given the effect
of socialization and the expectation of a generational change (Sztompka 1996). Finally, we
have added marital and occupational status as dummy variables: marital status is equal to 1
for married respondents (0 otherwise) and occupational status is equal to 1 for the
respondents who have performed paid work during the seven days before the survey (0
otherwise).
In addition to demographic variables, we also introduce two attitudinal variables: social
and political trust.
3 Both indicators of trust are constructed through a PCA using the
Table 1 Citizenship
components
Source European Social Survey
2002
Engaged
citizenship
Citizen duty
Active in voluntary associations 0.86
Active in politics 0.81
Supporting people worse off 0.67
Forming independent opinions 0.57
Voting in elections 0.85
Obeying laws and regulations 0.85
Eigenvalue: 2.15 1.44
Percentage variance: 53.84 71.85
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.71 0.58
2 The internal consistency (measured by Cronbach’s alpha) is relatively low with regard to the component
of citizenship duty. This is obviously (partly) because of the short battery. Unfortunately, the ESS only
includes the two-item solution to measure norms of citizenship duty.
3 Note that the explanation of citizenship norms by trust may face problems of reverse causality. Indeed,
one may argue that trust affects the creation of citizenship norms, but an alternative argument could be that
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123responses on multiple related statements. Social trust pertains to trust in people. The scale
includes agreement (ranging from 0 tot 10) that ‘‘most people can be trusted,’’ ‘‘most
people try to be fair,’’ and ‘‘people mostly try to be helpful.’’ This three-item scale of social
trust allows for a more precise measurement of social or general trust than the use of a
single item (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008). The component of trust in institutions spans trust
in the following types of institutions: the legal system, parliament, politicians, the police
and the United Nations. The possible answers for the ﬁve items for trust in institutions
range from (0) ‘‘no trust at all’’ to (10) ‘‘complete trust.’’
Descriptive statistics for all variables in our analyses are provided in Table 2.
4 Cross-National Differences in Citizenship Norms
In addition to describing levels of our dependent and independent variables, Table 2 is
useful to look at cross-national differences in citizenship norms. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in both citizenship norms across our sample of four Eastern European countries.
In Hungary, duty-based norms of citizenship, which stress obligations to the state and
participation through elections, are omnipresent, but engaged citizenship is low. Hungarian
citizens seem to deﬁne citizenship more in terms of duties and obligations than in terms of
engagement and self-expression. The opposite is found for people in Slovenia, who hold an
engaged image of citizenship rather than a duty-based one. The citizens of the Czech
Republic are characterized by the lowest level of civic norms. Finally, Polish citizens score
relatively high on both measures of civic mindedness.
These differences in citizenship norms across a range of Eastern European countries
underline that the region of Eastern Europe cannot be considered as a monolithic entity. As
discussed above, even though all countries in the region underwent a lengthy period of
socialization to Soviet-style norms and behavior, and were characterized by similar state
and party structures and economic and social mechanisms (McGregor 1996), there are
broad contrasts between the countries. Our ﬁndings seem to conﬁrm that citizens of the
Czech Republic which had a strong egalitarian structure and rigid communism (Wallace
1997; Janos 1996), and where the leadership did not show any willingness to accept the
movement toward democratic reform (Ishiyama 1995; Wolchik 1992) have the weakest
norms of citizenship. In Poland, on the other hand, where the communist system had more
difﬁculties to penetrate into society (Korbonski 1992), citizens appear to hold more civic-
oriented norms. Besides, Poland is the best-known example of a strong Catholic state, with
the most crowded churches in Europe and a low level of religious fractionalization
(Alesina et al. 2003), and evidence suggests that ‘‘religious legacies leave a distinct and
lasting imprint on contemporary values’’ (Norris and Inglehart 2003: 7).
The emphasis of Slovenia’s citizens on engaged citizenship norms may be linked to
the civil tranquility and strong economic growth which have marked the period after
the country’s independence. United Nations (2002) ﬁgures also indicate that Slovenia
Footnote 3 continued
trust is fostered by norms of social citizenship. In studies of social capital, the claim of a connection between
membership in voluntary associations and democracy is based on the assumption that membership in
voluntary associations facilitates the effects of socialisation as well as democratic learning (Stolle 1998).
Within voluntary associations or so-called schools of democracy, opinions, attitudes and ideas may indeed
be formed. Yet, because we are looking at citizenship norms rather than behaviour, we believe that the
problem of causality is less severe in our analysis. Having ideas about citizenship is less likely to inﬂuence
trust than is social behaviour (such as participation in voluntary organizations).
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123has—together with Poland—the highest level of education among the former Soviet
countries. The link between these social characteristics and the norms of engaged citi-
zenship among Slovenia’s citizens corresponds with Dalton’s (2006b) argument that a new
style of citizen politics is developing as a result of the socioeconomic transformation of
these countries. Dalton (2006b) states that the changes in Western societies, which have led
to a new form of post-industrial society over the past ﬁve decades, have resulted in a new
pattern of political thought and action. Rather than stressing the citizen’s obligations to the
state and participation through elections, this new idea of citizenship emphasizes self-
expressive and self-actualizing values. That Slovenians are less respectful of authority and
less likely to deﬁne citizenship in duty-based terms may thus be linked to the more post-
industrial structure of the country. Indeed, Dyson (2007) argues that Slovenia’s economic
structure is closer to the West-European (Euro Area) states than it is to other Eastern
European states.
Even though these explanations of cross-national differences are tentative, our ﬁndings
seem to support the inﬂuence of the peculiarities of the countries’ political and historical
context on citizens’ civic mindedness.
5 Explanatory Multivariate Analysis
In order to test the inﬂuence of the different explanatory variables presented above on
citizenship norms, we performed separate regression analyses for each dependent variable
and for the four countries separately (see Table 3). In doing this, we not only investigate
the explanatory value of the different variables, but also explore whether signiﬁcant dif-
ferences appeared across the Eastern European countries included in our study.
Let us start the discussion of the results with the variable of religion. The effect of
religiosity on citizenship norms is limited. We only ﬁnd the magnitude and positive
inﬂuence of religion on participation typical in Western Europe in Poland with respect to
civic norms. Of course, nowhere in Eastern Europe but Poland, the church was so closely
connected with anti-communist resistance and so effective in resisting the communist
regime (Schanda 2003; Stark 2001). However, whereas religiosity is signiﬁcantly related to
citizenship norms in Poland, church attendance does not inﬂuence Polish people’s civic
mindedness. In the other countries by contrast, the effect of church attendance is—with the
exception of citizen duty in the Czech Republic—signiﬁcant. Differences thus occur
between the four Eastern European countries in our sample. In contrast to previous par-
ticipation research that revealed low inﬂuence of church attendance in Eastern Europe, it
seems a relevant predictor for citizenship norms in Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. Church attendance positively affects norms of duty-based citizenship in Hungary
and Slovenia and engaged citizenship in the three countries, underscoring Durkheim’s
(1912) claim about the effect of participation in rituals on solidarity and morality.
In the Czech Republic, the educational level does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence citizenship
norms. Education also seems irrelevant when explaining individual differences in norms of
engaged citizenship in Poland and norms of citizens’ duty in Slovenia. In Hungary and in
Poland—with respect to citizenship duty norms—education has the effect on citizenship
norms that is generally observed in the literature on civic participation (Coffe ´ and Geys
2007; Dalton 2006b; Hooghe 2003a): higher education propels civic mindedness. In
Slovenia, the respondents with a secondary level of education distinguish themselves from
the lower and higher educated with their high level of civic mindedness. So once again,
differences between countries occur.
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123In contrast to the so-called gender gap with respect to political and civic participation
(Hooghe 2003a; Verba et al. 1997), gender differences in citizenship norms in Eastern
Europe seem limited. Besides, in those cases where differences occur (i.c. norms of citizen
duty in Hungary and both engaged and duty-based citizenship in Slovenia), women hold
stronger norms of good citizenship, supporting previous claims about women’s more social
attitudes and more law-abiding behavior (Hooghe 2003b; Steffensmeier and Allan 1996;
Tyler 2006).
As far as age is concerned, we ﬁnd that younger respondents have signiﬁcantly fewer
norms of duty-based citizenship than do older respondents. This corresponds with par-
ticipation research (Putnam 2000) and Dalton’s (2006a, 2008b) conclusion with respect to
Americans’ citizenship norms. Dalton (2006a, 2008b) noticed that the post-war baby-boom
generation and Americans who came of age at the end of World War II scored highest on
citizenship duty. They deﬁne citizenship in terms of duties and obligations. At the same
time, he found that ‘‘the erosion of duty-based norms is counterbalanced by somewhat
greater support for norms of engaged citizenship among younger cohorts’’ (Dalton 2006a:
10). Dalton (2008b: 39) believes that the young reﬂect a more deliberative image of
citizenship. Our results for engaged citizenship norms in Eastern European countries do not
ﬁnd a similar generational shift in citizenship norms. Year of birth is not signiﬁcantly
correlated with engaged citizenship in Hungary, but it is signiﬁcantly but negatively related
to engaged citizenship in Slovenia, Poland and—weakly—in the Czech Republic. This
contradicts the argument stated in previous research (Howard 2002) on civil society in
post-communist Europe that a generational shift might result in an increase in organiza-
tional membership and participation.
Being married has a positive inﬂuence on the orientation of Polish citizens toward both
components of citizenship and also has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the formation of
norms of citizen duty in Hungary. This ﬁnding is in line with Putnam’s (1996) argument
that single people—both men and women, divorced, separated and never married—are
signiﬁcantly less engaged civically than married people. Yet, it is only a relevant predictor
in three of our eight models, again underlying cross-national differences in the explanatory
power of variables.
The inﬂuence of occupational status on citizenship norms is limited. It is only a relevant
catalyst for engaged norms of citizenship in Slovenia: Slovenian citizens who have paid
work display fewer norms of engaged citizenship.
Turning to the attitudinal explanatory variables, we ﬁnd that there is a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between trust in institutions and both components of citizenship
norms in all four countries. With the exception of engaged citizenship in the Czech
Republic, the relationship is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level of signiﬁcance. The results are
more mixed with regard to social trust. The inﬂuence of social trust on citizenship norms is
highly signiﬁcant and positive in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, social trust is signiﬁ-
cantly and positively correlated only with the norms of engaged citizenship. In Poland, on
the other hand, social trust is only signiﬁcantly, but weakly, related to the more traditional
type of citizenship. Moreover, in contrast to previous research on participation, the rela-
tionship is negative in Poland: the higher the level of social trust, the lower the norms of
citizen duty. A similar negative relationship is found in Slovenia, for both norms of
engaged citizenship and citizenship duty. Hence, the variable of social trust that is tradi-
tionally associated positively with civic participation (Putnam 1995) performs differently
for citizenship norms in Slovenia and Poland.
In general, vertical trust seems to provide a better explanation of citizenship norms than
horizontal or social trust. This appears to validate the ﬁndings of Letki (2004) in Eastern
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123Europe and Dekker et al. (1997) in Western Europe that people do not base democratic
citizenship on the basis of whether they believe people can be trusted. Our ﬁndings reveal
that people seem to need to trust their national institutions in order to hold participatory
citizenship norms.
Before turning to our conclusion and discussion, it is important to note that the
explained variance of the models is relatively low. It was only possible to explain more
than 10 per cent of the variance for the duty type of citizenship norms in three countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia). The explained variance for the engaged type
of citizenship varies between 5 per cent (Poland) and 10 per cent (Slovenia). The fact that
the explained variance is generally lower for the concept of engaged citizenship might
indicate that this more expressive and participatory type of citizenship is more difﬁcult to
explain via socio-economic characteristics which have traditionally been related to con-
ventional types of political and civic participation, at least in those Eastern European
countries included in our study. It should also be noted that the explained variance in
previous research on civic participation in general (Badescu and Neller 2007; Hooghe
2003a) and norms of good citizenship in particular (Denters et al. 2007) has generally been
relatively low. Besides, comparative research on civic and political participation including
both Western and Eastern European countries consistently found lower levels of explained
variance for the Eastern European countries (Armingeon 2007; Badescu and Neller 2007).
It shows that theories and models developed in Western societies cannot simply be
exported to recently developed democracies.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Compared to citizens from Western Europe, Eastern European citizens show lower levels
of civic and political engagement; a gap which has been ascribed to the domination of
communism within that Eastern European region for several decades. Due to the legacy of
communism, there are also grounds to expect weak citizenship norms. Citizens need to (re-
)learn civic and political attitudes and behavior, and previous research has indeed shown a
low level of citizen participation in civil society and politics in Eastern Europe (Geremek
1992; Howard 2002; Lomax 1997; Smolar 1996). It is surprising that no previous large-
scale empirical analysis has—to the best of our knowledge—considered citizens’ own
deﬁnition of citizenship or civic mindedness in these newly established democracies,
because citizens’ own deﬁnitions of citizenship could help to get a fuller understanding of
political and civic behavior. Therefore, in this paper, we have considered how citizens
themselves deﬁne ‘‘good citizenship’’ in four Eastern European countries (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). In particular, we have studied duty-based and
engaged norms of citizenship, as deﬁned by Dalton (2006a, 2008a, b). Whereas the ﬁrst
stresses citizen obligations to the state and participation through elections, the second
refers to social engagement and social concern. We have compared the presence of both
citizenship norms in the Eastern European countries included in our study and developed a
model of citizenship norms based in previous research on civic and political participation.
Signiﬁcant differences in the level of civic mindedness between the different countries
occur. Citizens of the Czech Republic score lowest on both types of citizenship norms.
Polish citizens have an image of citizenship that is both strongly engaged and duty-based.
Hungarian citizens seem to hold a traditional view regarding citizenship, focussing on the
need to participate in elections and obey laws. Slovenian citizens, on the other hand, have a
more modern deﬁnition of citizenship and deﬁne it more in terms of engagement. These
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123ﬁndings seem to support the view that the communist experience and the penetration of
communism within society still inﬂuences citizens’ views on citizenship, thus supporting
the cultural theories that emphasize the macro-context within which political learning and
the development of political norms and attitudes occur (Mishler and Rose 2002).
Moving onto our explanatory models for citizenship norms, our results ﬁt nicely with
some established claims on civic and political participation (mostly from studies on
Western democracies): older people and people with high levels of trust in institutions
show more civic mindedness. For other variables however, our ﬁndings contradict previous
participation research and—what is probably more intriguing—show contradictory ﬁnd-
ings between different countries. To give one example, whereas social trust is signiﬁcantly
and positively related to citizenship norms in the Czech Republic and Hungary (with the
exception of citizen duty where there is no signiﬁcant effect), it is signiﬁcantly and neg-
atively related to civic mindedness in Poland and Slovenia.
This cross-national variation, both in level of civic mindedness and in the relationships
between some individual explanatory variables and citizenship norms, highlight that
Eastern Europe cannot be considered as a monolithic and homogeneous bloc. While all
countries in the region underwent a lengthy period of socialization to Soviet-style norms
and behavior, and were characterized by similar state and party structures and economic
and social mechanisms (McGregor 1996), there are broad contrasts between the countries.
These differences among communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the penetration of
communism in the different societies may explain the differences in citizenship norms.
Future research should investigate this tentative explanation in greater detail and further
investigate the relevance of the peculiarities of the countries’ political and historical
context.
We believe that this assessment of citizenship norms in Eastern European countries
provides an interesting complement to previous research on civil society and political and
civic participation. Dalton (2008a) has indeed argued that an understanding of citizens’
ideas of citizenship is needed to gain a more complete understanding of their political and
civic behavior. Yet, Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007: 104) note that, ‘‘the greater insti-
tutional uncertainty in Eastern Europe may cause citizens to be unwilling to translate
democratic values in practice.’’ Hence, a next interesting step would be a comprehensive
study on the link between citizenship norms and political and civic behavior.
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